Alice Hoffenberg Amsden (June 27, 1943 – March 14, 2012) was a political economist and scholar of state-led economic development. For the last two decades of her career, she was the Barton L. Weller Professor of Political Economy at MIT. Eun Mee Kim helped illuminate how Amsden was received in South Korea. Interestingly, she noted how Asia’s Next Giant was not simply a reporting of what South Korea was already aware of for a Western audience. Indeed, the book helped South Korean’s understand that what was happening there was significant. Amsden saw it first. Asia S Next Giant. Download Now Read. Author by: Alice Hoffenberg Amsden Languange Used: en Release. Magazines & Comics & many more directly on your browser.
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Through a comparative, longitudinal analysis of the wine industry in two Argentine provinces, this article finds that different political approaches to reform and not simply socioeconomic endowments determine the ability of societies to build new institutions for economic upgrading. A “depoliticization” approach emphasizes the imposition of arm’s-length incentives by a powerful, insulated government but exacerbates social fragmentation and impedes upgrading. A “participatory restructuring” approach promotes the creation and maintenance of new public-private institutions for upgrading via rules of inclusive membership and multiparty, deliberative governance. This latter approach can facilitate collaboration and knowledge creation among the government and previously isolated, even antagonistic, stakeholder groups.
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Keywords upgrading, institutional change, Latin America, participatory governance, agriculture
| Excellent analyses of the upgrading and its socio-institutional foundations can be found in Richard F. Doner , Bryan K. Ritchie , and Dan Slater , “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective,” International Organization 59, no. 2 (2005): 327-361; Google ScholarE. Giuliani , C. Pietrobelli , and R. Rabellotti , “Upgrading in Global Value Chains: Lessons from Latin American Clusters,” World Development 33, no. 4 (2005): 549-573. Google ScholarOn the indeterminate impact of FDI and export firms on upgrading see CEPAL , ed., Globalization and Development (CEPAL, 2002); Google ScholarPeter Cornelius and Bruce Kogut , Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy, Global Outlook Series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Google ScholarHubert Schmitz , ed., Local Enterprises in the Global Economy: Issues of Governance and Upgrading (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004). Google Scholar | Crossref |
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| For discussions of the lack of systematic comparative analysis on upgrading and clusters and the use of subnational research designs to fill the void, see Alfred P. Montero , Shifting States in Global Markets: Subnational Industrial Policy in Contemporary Brazil and Spain (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Google ScholarHubert Schmitz and Khalid Nadvi , “Clustering and Industrialization: Introduction,” World Development 27 (1999): 1503-1733; Google ScholarRichard Snyder , “Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method,” Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 1 (2001): 93-110. Google Scholar | Crossref |
| On Argentine industrial policy since WWII, see Mauro Guillen , The Limits of Covergence: Globalization and Organizational Change in Argentina, South Korea, and Spain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Google ScholarBen Ross Schneider , Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Google Scholar | Crossref |
| On the relationship between political power, institutional change, and constructing the modern regulative state, see Laszlo Bruszt , “Market Making as State Making: Constitutions and Economic Development in Post-Communist Eastern Europe,” Constitutional Political Economy 13, no. 1 (2002): 53-72; Google ScholarGrzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson , “Time, Space, and Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, ed. G. Ekiert and S. E. Hanson (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15-48; Google ScholarWade Jacoby , Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Google ScholarKathleen Thelen , “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208-240. Google Scholar | Crossref |
| These views build on Peter Evans , “Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation,” Studies in Comparative International Development 38, no. 4 (2004): 30-52; Google ScholarArchon Fung and Erik Olin Wright , “Deepening Democracy: Innovation in Empowered Participatory Government,” Politics & Society 29, no. 1 (2001): 5-41; Google ScholarPaul Q. Hirst , Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); Google ScholarCharles Sabel , “Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development,” in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, ed. N. J. Smelser and R. Swedberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 137-165. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals |
| This research was based on field work during 2003-2005 that utilized sixty-two open-ended interviews with relevant managers, enologists, agronomists, and policy makers in Mendoza and San Juan as well as current and historical databases on relevant provincial and national policies, civic associations, and firms. Google Scholar |
| See especially Giuliani et al. , “Upgrading in Global Value Chains”; Google ScholarSchmitz , Local Enterprises in the Global Economy; Google ScholarPeter A. Hall and David W. Soskice , Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, UK, and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Google ScholarRichard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter , “Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 2 (2002): 23-47. Google Scholar | Crossref |
| See Elinor Ostrom , “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 493-535; Google ScholarJohn F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell , “Robust Actions and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434,” American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 6 (1993): 1259-1319; Google ScholarRobert D. Putnam , Robert Leonardi , and Raffaella Nanetti , Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Google ScholarBen Ross Schneider , Business Politics and the State. Google Scholar | Crossref |
| See, for instance, Alice H. Amsden , Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Google ScholarMaxim Boycko , Andrei Shleifer , and Robert Vishny , Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Google ScholarStephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman , The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Google Scholar |
| On the limits of unilateral state action and the role of the state in coordinating private information and organizational experiments, see Pepper D. Culpepper , Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Google ScholarEvans , “Development as Institutional Change”; Google ScholarJacoby , Imitation and Politics; Google ScholarGerald A. McDermott , Embedded Politics: Industrial Networks and Institutional Change in Postcommunism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Google ScholarGerald A. McDermott , “Institutional Change and Firm Creation in East-Central Europe: An Embedded Politics Approach,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 2 (2004): 188-217; Google ScholarDani Rodrik , “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century,” in Working paper prepared for UNIDO (2004). Google Scholar | SAGE Journals |
| See M. Granovetter , “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 481-510; Google ScholarOstrom , “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons”; Google ScholarSean Safford , “Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown: Civic Infastructure and Mobilzation in Economic Crises Paper,” in MIT Industrial Performance Center Working Paper (2004); Google ScholarSchneider , Business Politics and the State. Google Scholar | Crossref |
| See Schneider , Business Politics and the State; Google ScholarDavid Stark and László Bruszt , Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Google ScholarJudith Tendler , Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Google Scholar |
| See Gianpaolo Baiocchi , “Participation, Activism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory,” Politics & Society 29, no. 1 (2001): 43-72; Google ScholarFung and Wright , “Deepening Democracy”; Google ScholarCharles F. Sabel and Joshua Cohen , “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy,” European Law Journal 3, no. 4 (1997): 313-340. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals |
| For the recombinatory effects, see Richard M. Locke , Remaking the Italian Economy: Local Politics and Industrial Change in Contemporary Italy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Google ScholarSafford , “Why the Garden Club”; Google ScholarStark and Bruszt , Postsocialist Pathways. Google ScholarFor the role of collective problem solving in the firm, see Susan Helper , John Paul MacDuffie , and Charles Sabel , “Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism,” Industrial and Corporate Change 9, no. Issue 3 (2000): 443-488; Google ScholarJohn Paul MacDuffie , “The Road to ‘Root Cause’: Shop-Floor Problem-Solving at Three Auto Assembly Plants,” Management Science 43, no. 4 (1997): 479-502; Google ScholarBill McEvily and Alfred Marcus , “Embedded Ties and the Acquisition of Competitive Capabilities,” Strategic Management Journal 26, no. 11 (2005): 1033-1055; Google Scholarand in policy making and promoting cooperation, see Culpepper , Creating Cooperation; Google ScholarHirst , Associative Democracy; Google ScholarOstrom , “Coping with Tragedies”; Google ScholarSabel , “Learning by Monitoring.” Google Scholar | Crossref |
| The most detailed accounts are in Daniel Azpiazu and Eduardo Basualdo, “Industria Vitivinicola,” ed. Estudios Sectorials: Estudio 1.EG.33.6 (Argentina: CEPAL, 2003); Google ScholarDereck Foster , Revolucion en el Mundo de los Vinos (Buenos Aires: Ennio Ayosa Impresores, 1995); Google ScholarAlejandro Walters, “Rebuilding Technologically Competitive Industries: Lessons from Chile’s and Argentina’s Wine Industry Restructuring,” PhD Thesis (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999). Google Scholar |
| On improvements in varietals and export markets, see Hugo Cetrangolo et al., El Negocio de los Vinos en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: FAUBA, 2002). Data on export markets can be found in the annual reports of the Instituto Nacional de Vitvinicola (INV) of Argentina. Google ScholarSee also Mercedes Nimo, “Analisis de la Cadena de Vinos,” SAGPyA, Gobierno de la Republica de Argentina, 2001. According to the data of Wine Spectator and Wine Enthusiast, Chilean and Argentine have about the same median price per bottle at $10-$12 and standard deviations (author’s calculations). Google ScholarFor Chilean reactions to the quality and pricing gains by Argentine export wines, see “La Amenanza a las Vinas Chilenas,” El Mercurio (November 2, 2005). Google ScholarAn analysis of the quality scores in these magazines during the past ten years reveals more Argentine wines than Chilean in the top clasifications since 2000. Google Scholar |
| For more on this strategy, see Cetrangolo et al., El Negocio de los Vinos, Google Scholarand the lengthy annual reviews of Argentine wines in Wine Spectator (November 15, 1995; December 15, 1997; March 24, 2003; November 30, 2004; November 30, 2005). Google Scholar |
| For overviews of the change in Argentine practices and the trends elsewhere, see Adriana Bocco and Guillermo Neiman, “Reestructuracion de la Vitivinicultura Mendocina: Nuevas Relaciones entre Actores y Espacios” (paper presented at the XI Jornadas Cuyanas de Geografia, Mendoza: 25 al 28 de Noviembre de 2002); Google ScholarCetrangolo et al., El Negocio de los Vinos; Google ScholarElisa Giuliani and M. Bell , “The Micro-Determinants of Meso-Level Learning and Innovation: Evidence from a Chilean Wine Cluster,” Research Policy 34, no. 1 (2005): 47-68; Google ScholarJames Henderson , Luciana Pagani , and Karel Cool , “Collective Resources and Cluster Advantage: An Examination of the Global Wine Industry” (working paper, 2004); Google ScholarPeter Roberts and Paul Ingram , “Vertical Linkages, Knowledge Transfer and Export Performance: The Australian and New Zealand Wine Industry, 1987-1999,” (working paper, 2002); Google ScholarWalters , “Rebuilding Technologically Competitive Industries.” Google Scholar | Crossref |
| The calculations were made using data from the INV. For more on the relative advances of Mendoza, see Cetrangolo et al., El Negocio de los Vinos; Google ScholarInstituto de Desarrollo Rural—IDR, “Caracterizacion del Sector Vitivincola de Mendoza” (Mendoza: IDR, 1998), 180; Google ScholarInstituto de Desarrollo Rural—IDR, “Situacion Actual de la Vitivincultura,” in Serie de Informes de Coyuntura, ed. L. Pannocchia (Mendoza: IDR, 2002), 69; Google ScholarGuillermo Neiman, Adriana Bocco, and Clara Martin, “Tradicional y Moderno: Una Aproximacion a los Cambios Cuantitativos y Cualitativos de le Demanda de Mano de Obra en le Cultivo de Vid,” in Trabajo de Campo: Produccion, Technologiay y Empleo en el Medio Rural, ed. G. Neiman (Buenos Aires: Ciccus, 2001). On the difficulties of coordination to achieve dynamic capabilities, see note 8. Google Scholar |
| Between 1980 and 1990, the number of vineyards fell by 31 percent and then another 29 percent until 2001; the amount of vineyard surface area fell by about 35 percent in the 1980s and then slightly declined in the 1990s. As of 2001, vineyards in both provinces with less than twenty-five have still accounted for about 92 percent of the total number and 60 percent of surface area. (Calculations based on INV data.) According to the agricultural survey of the Mendoza for 2003, the largest eighteen vineyard owners controlled only 5 percent of surface area dedicated to grape growing for wine, and about 1,100 owners controlled about 50 percent. The range of grape suppliers per winery ranges from ten to 300. Google ScholarSee Cetrangolo et al., El Negocio de los Vinos. Google Scholar |
| I draw here on a few studies that attempt to clarify the terrain of the principal fine wine companies, using different sets of data: Santiago Blazquez, “Analisis de la Competitivad de los Vinos Finos Argentinos” (master’s thesis, Universidad de Belgrano, 2001); Google ScholarCetrangolo et al., El Negocio de los Vinos; Google ScholarHernan Vila, “Vid,” Programa Nacional de Investigación Frutales (INTA, 2002); Google ScholarAna Maria Ruiz and Hernan Vila , “Structural Changes and Strategies of the Argentinean Wine Chain Actors,” in Wine in the Old World: New Risks and Opportunities, ed. S. Gatti , E. Giraud-Heraud , and S. Mili (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2003). Google ScholarAccording to a 2003 survey by the Ministry of Economy of Mendoza of 400 wineries, only 4 percent have foreign investment and about 6 percent are associated with or controlled by a diversified Argentine business group or corporation. Foreign investors control less than half of the thirty top exporters, and FDI accounts for about half of the $1 billion to $1.5 billion invested in the wine industry in Argentina between 1991 and 2003, with most coming after 1996. Google ScholarSee also Consejo Empresario Mendocino, “Inversiones Extranjeras En Mendoza” (Mendoza: 1999); Google ScholarNimo, “Analisis de la Cadena de Vinos.” Google Scholar |
| The surface area share of high and medium enological value gapes/vines in the Zona Este vineyards increased to about 26 percent of its total by 1998 and to more than 37 percent by 2001 (author’s calculations based on INV data). By 2003, about 55 percent of Zona Este wineries had modern quality control systems and also accounted for almost a third of those exporting from Mendoza (author’s calculations based on data from a 2003 survey of 400 wineries in Mendoza undertaken by the province’s Ministry of Economy). Google ScholarSee also Adriana Bocco, “Los Trabajadores y el Trabajo en la Crisis” (paper presented at the 6th Congreso Nacional de Estudios del Trabajo, Buenos Aires, August 13-16, 2003); Google ScholarCetrangolo et al., El Negocio de los Vinos; Google Scholar“Cosecha 1999-2002,” La revista de la Bolsa, no. 441 (October 2002): 4-7. Google Scholar |
| Alejandro B. Rofman, Desarrollo Regional y Exclusión Social: Transformaciones y Crisis en la Argentina Contemporánea (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1999), 254. Google Scholar |
| Argentina ranks consistently low in the World Bank and World Economic Forum measures of rule of law and property rights protection. Google ScholarSee the data at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/index.html. Google ScholarOn general legal similarities as they affect business, see the analysis of provincial business climate in FIEL, El Ambeinte de Negocios en las Provincias Argentinas (Buenos Aires: FIEL, 2003a). Google ScholarAccording to FIEL, the number of property crimes per 1,000 inhabitants was 42.6 in Mendoza and 25.8 in San Juan. Google Scholar |
| Remmer and Wibbels argue that the lower margin of victory in gubernatorial elections indicates more competition. In 1991 and 1995, the margin in San Juan was 20.64 and 19.28, and in Mendoza, 2.53 and 22.54. Google ScholarKaren Remmer and Erik Wibbels , “The Subnational Politics of Economic Adjustment: Provincal Politics and Fiscal Performance in Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 4 (2000): 419-451; Google ScholarErik Wibbels , Federalism and the Market: Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing World (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Google Scholar | SAGE Journals |
| On the roles of educated elites and foreign consultants in general, see Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal , “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation,” Administrative Science Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1990): 128-152; Google ScholarJ. Nicholas Ziegler , Governing Ideas: Strategies for Ideas in France and Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). Google ScholarWith respect to Mendoza and San Juan, see Foster, Revolucion en el Mundo; Walters, “Rebuilding Technologically Competitive Industries,” ch. 3. Google Scholar | Crossref |
| This type of story was repeated to me on ten different occasions. Google ScholarSee also Walters , “Rebuilding Technologically Competitive Industries,” 115-118. Google Scholar |
| According to UNIDO, the number of NGOs per 1,000 inhabitants in the 1990s was 2.3 in Mendoza and 2.18 in San Juan. Google ScholarRelated documents and data are available at http://www.undp.org.ar/sociedad-civil/. Google ScholarSan Juan had five wine/grape sectoral associations, one peak-level economic federation, and one export association; Mendoza had six wine/grape sectoral associations, two peak-level economic federations, and one export association. Google ScholarMarcelo Paladino and Juan Manuel Jauregui, “La Transformacion del Sector Vitivinicola Argentino” (Argentina: IAE, Universidad Austral, 2001); Google ScholarRofman, Desarrollo Regional. Google Scholar |
| On the use of past ties for new forms of collaboration, see McDermott , Embedded Politics; Google ScholarCharles F. Sabel , “Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy,” Human Relations 46, no. 9 (1993): 1133-1170; Google ScholarStark and Bruszt , Postsocialist Pathways. Google ScholarThere were no CREA groups in San Juan until 2003. Between 1990 and 1996, the number of CREA groups grew from three to six, falling in the late 1990s back to three in Mendoza. Google ScholarOn the CREA and evaluation events, see Paladino and Jauregui, “La Transformacion Del Sector;” Google ScholarWalters , “Rebuilding Technologically Competitive Industries,” 149-155. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals |
| On the conflicts between the zones, see Walters , “Rebuilding Technologically Competitive Industries,” 150-152; Google Scholarthe quote is from Walters, 122. Google Scholar |
| On this dual nature, see Locke, Remaking the Italian Economy; Google ScholarOstrom , “Coping with Tragedies”; Google ScholarPadgett , “Organizational Genesis”; Google ScholarSafford , “Why the Garden Club”; Google ScholarSchneider , Business Politics and the State. Google ScholarThis problem is also understood in the phenomenon of structural holes in society. Google ScholarSee Ronald S. Burt , “The Network Structure of Social Capital,” in Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 22, ed. R. Sutton and B. Staw (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 2000), 345-423; Google ScholarSafford , “Why the Garden Club.” Google Scholar |
| See G. Schwartz and C. Liuksila , “Argentina,” in Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice, ed. T. Ter-Minassian (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997), 387-422. Google Scholar |
| Promoción industrial was started in 1973 and included San Juan in 1983 as the fourth beneficiary, in addition to the provinces of Catamarca, La Rioja, and San Luis. By 1990, it had gained about 290 projects in manufacturing and agriculture at a federal fiscal cost of about $1.2 billion. When the program was suspended in 1987, San Juan offered its own tax incentive program in 1988, promoting specifically the planting of fine wine grape vines. Menem renewed it, first in 1991 by decree and then in 1996 by law. Google ScholarMaria Celia Guinazu, “The Subnational Politics of Structural Adjustment in Argentina: The Case of San Luis” (PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003); Google ScholarDaniel Heymann and Bernardo P. Kosacoff, La Argentina de los Noventa: Desempeäno Econâomico en un Contexto de Reformas, 1st ed., 2 vols. (Buenos Aires; Eudeba: Naciones Unidas, CEPAL, 2000); Google ScholarHugo Eugenio Zudaire, Incentivos Tributarios y el Costo Fiscal de la Promocion Industrial (Buenos Aires: La Ley, 2001). Google ScholarIts revised form focused on deferring about 75 percent of income taxes to the investor in agroindustrial and tourism projects. Estimates put the federal fiscal cost at about $7 billion in the 1990s. For details on the investments in San Juan vineyards and on the cost to Mendoza in output, see Augustin Borsani, “Los Diferimientos Impositivos Agropecuarios en la Provincia de San Juan,” Apuntes Agroeconomicos 2, no. 3 (2001); Google ScholarConsejo Empresario Mendocino, “Impacto Economico de los Regimenes de Promocion de las Provincias San Juan, San Luis, La Rioja y Catamarca” (CEM, 1999). Google Scholar |
| See Leopoldo Allub , “Globalizacion y Modernizacion Agroindustrial en la Provincia de San Juan, Argentina,” Estudios Sociologicos 14, no. 41 (1996): 473-492; Google ScholarRofman , Desarrollo Regional; Google ScholarGobierno de San Juan, “Proyecto de Fortalecimiento Institucional Para el Desarrollo Rural: Provincia de San Juan” (2004). Google Scholar |
| As in every province, the federal government had three main programs for agroindustry: a small fund for subsidized loans to small and medium-sized firms administered by the state-owned Banco de la Nacion, food subsidies for poor farmers, and the underfunded San Juan unit of INTA, the federal system of regional agricultural R&D and training centers. Bocco, “Los Trabajadores”; Google ScholarGobierno de San Juan, “Proyecto de Fortalecimiento.” Google Scholar |
| For detailed accounts of these conflicts, see Gago and De La Torre, “Las Nuevas Tendencias de Desigualdad, Polarización y Exclusión: El Impacto de la Acumulación Vigente en una Región Argentina,” La Rábida, España, septiembre (1996); Google ScholarRofman, Desarrollo Regional. Google Scholar |
| Carlos Cheppi, “La Nueva Arquitectura de los Programs de Intervencion y Su Rol en el Desarrollo Rural” (INTA, 2000); Google ScholarMario J. Lattuada, Cambio Rural: Politica y Desarrollo en la Argentina de los ‘90, 1st ed. (Rosario, Argentina: CED-Arcasur Editorial, 2000). Google Scholar |
| Azpiazu and Basualdo, “Industria Vitivinicola,” 61-63. Google Scholar |
| Gobierno de San Juan, “Proyecto De Fortalecimiento.” Google Scholar |
| I draw here on detailed accounts by Maria de la Esperanza Juri, “Argentina: Privitization of a Government-Owned Winery” (CIPE, 2005); Google ScholarMarcelo Paladino and Felix Morales, “Bodegas y Vinedos Giol E.E.I.C.,” (Argentina: Universidad Austral, 1994); Google ScholarPaladino and Jauregui, “La Transformacion del Sector.” In 1987, Giol was losing more than $500,000 per month and had a debt of more than $35 million. Google Scholar |
| During 1988 and 1989, Bordon appointed an outside auditing commission, and Giol spun off periphery units (such as in fruit, bottling, distilling) and reduced employment from 3,500 to about 300. Also, seven co-ops purchased wineries, and twelve leased them in the beginning. Leverage was slashed, and virtually all the new cooperatives paid back the special loans ahead of maturity. Google Scholar |
| For the gains in Fecovita and the cooperatives in wine/grapes, see Francesca Amendola, “Estrategias de las Cooperativas Vitivinicolas de la Provincia de Mendoza, de Argentina” (Montpellier: Centre National d’Etudes Agronomiques des Regions Chaudes, 2003); Google ScholarRuiz and Vila , “Structural Changes and Strategies.” Google ScholarFecovita now includes thirty-two cooperatives and commercializes more than 80 precent of the wine made by its members, and each cooperative ranges from twenty to 120 members. By 2002, Fecovita had sales of more than $54 million, 28 percent of which was exports. More recently, it has emphasized improvements in packaging, bottling, and label management and expanding medium-quality fine wine (e.g., Marcus James in the U.S.). There was virtually no growth in the number of wine cooperatives in San Juan in the 1990s. Google Scholar |
| The data come from the PROINDER program of the Secretary of Agriculture of the federal government. During 2000-2003, each province documented all existing polices related to agriculture, such as prevention and diminished impact of negative climatic shocks, subsidized credits for small and medium farmers for improvements in technology, water management, and grape conversion, extension services, and so on. Google ScholarFor more details, see the policy documents authored by the Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Pesca y Alimentacion of the Gobierno de Mendoza (2000), “Diagnostico de la Capacidad Institutional Para el Desarrollo Rural Provincial: Provincia de Mendoza” and “Proyecto de Asistencia Tecnica Para el Desarrollo Rural Provincial: Provincia de Mendoza.” Google Scholar |
| See Ansell , “The Networked Polity”; Google ScholarFung and Wright , “Deepening Democracy”; Google ScholarThelen , “How Institutions Evolve.” Google Scholar |
| INTA’s budget was radically changed, as the federal government eliminated its primary stable source of funding, a 1.5 percent tax on agricultural exports, incorporating INTA’s funding into the general government budget. The national Executive Committee includes representatives of the federal government, agricultural educational institutions, and the top agricultural producers’ associations. This committee still appoints the directors of the regional centers (e.g., INTA Mendoza). INTA has gone through three reorganizations between 1991 and 2005. For instance, from 1991 to 1997, the Cuyo center concerned only Mendoza and San Juan, and then from 1997 to 2004, this center included the provinces of of La Rioja and San Luis as well. Since 2005, the Center has returned to include Mendoza and San Juan. Google ScholarFor details of the massive reorganizations and policies of INTA, see Gabriel G. Casaburi , Dynamic Agroindustrial Clusters: The Political Economy of Competitive Sectors in Argentina and Chile (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), chs. 4, 5, 7. Google Scholar | Crossref |
| By law, any firm that uses at least 20 percent of its input grapes for mosto (the natural juice sweetener) does not have to pay an annual, relatively small tariff to the Fondo. The Fondo Vitivinicola is financed from these tariffs and matching funds from the government of Mendoza. Google Scholar |
| A more complex depiction using a UCINET analysis of board membership of the institutions and associations can be found in Gerald A. McDermott , Rafael Corredoira , and Greg Kruse , “Public-Private Networks as Sources of Knowledge and Upgrading Capabilities: A Parametric Stroll through Argentine Vineyards” (Management Department, Wharton School, August, 2006). Google Scholar |
| On the ways that institutions or organizations that are encompassing, bridging, multiplex can promote horizontal embeddedness and adaptation, see Burt , “The Network Structure of Social Capital”; Google ScholarMontero , Shifting States in Global Markets; Google ScholarOstrom , “Coping with Tragedies”; Google ScholarPadgett and Ansell , “Robust Actions,” 1400-1434; Google ScholarSafford , “Why the Garden Club”; Google ScholarSchneider , Business Politics and the State. Google Scholar |
| INTA, Plan de Tecnología Regional (2001-2004): Centro Regional Cuyo (Ediciones INTA, 2002). Google Scholar |
| Within about four years, the program boasted nationwide more than 1,900 groups of more than 21,000 producers and a network of almost 200 full- and part-time field agents and consultants in many agricultural sectors. CR in Mendoza reached better than expected results. It claimed over 100 learning groups that accounted for about 1,250 producers, while in San Juan, it created only nineteen groups of 133 producers. By 1996, about 350 grape growers were already participating in CR Mendoza. Cheppi, “La Nueva Arquitectura”; Google ScholarLattuada , Cambio Rural, 72-76. Google Scholar |
| For a discussion of this key issue, see Casaburi , Dynamic Agroindustrial Clusters. Google Scholar |
| See Amendola, “Estrategias de las Cooperativas”; Google ScholarWalters , “Rebuilding Technologically Competitive Industries.” Google Scholar |
| The events in Mendoza, CODEVIN San Rafael (Zona Sur) in 1995 and CODEVIN de Zona Este in 1997, grew rapidly from a few dozen samples to more than 150 each within two to three years. San Juan firms created EVISAN in 1997 with the aid of INTA San Juan. It grew from fifty samples by fourteen participating wineries in 1997 to more than 102 samples by twenty-nine wineries in 2004. Google ScholarSee also Walters , “Rebuilding Technologically Competitive Industries,” 152-153. Google Scholar |
| See for instance, the accounts in Cetrangolo et al., El Negocio de los Vinos; Google ScholarRuiz and Vila , “Structural Changes and Strategies.” Google Scholar |
| According to data from these two universities, the number of students and graduates in agronomy and enology degree programs increased by 50 percent between 1996 and 2001. Google Scholar |
| The Instituto Tecnologico Universitario (ITU) was founded in 1993 by the Mendoza government, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Universidad Tecnológica Nacional, and two peak level Mendoza business associations to provide a three-year technical degree in management and technology. IDIT is very similar to IDR but focuses on manufacturing. Google Scholar |
| For discussion of changes to the regulations, see IDR, “Situacion Actual de la Vitivincultura”; Google ScholarJorge Tacchini, “Situation Actual de la Vitivinicultura,” in Serie de Informes de Coyuntura (Mendoza: Fundacion IDR, 2001), 66. Google Scholar |
| Azpiazu and Basualdo, “Industria Vitivinicola,” 60-61. Google Scholar |
| This is based on interviews and documentation of the minutes of relevant meetings at INTA Mendoza (on file with author). Google Scholar |
| The Ley Pevi and COVIAR were established in Ley 25.849 and Decreto Reglementario 1.191 of September 8, 2004. Google Scholar |
| On Russia, see Yoshiko M. Herrera , Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (New York: Cambridge, 2005); Google ScholarJuliet Johnson , “Path Contingency in Postcommunist Transformations,” Comparative Politics 33, no. 3 (2001): 253-274; Google ScholarDavid Woodruff , Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). Google ScholarOn China, see Yasheng Huang , Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era, Cambridge Modern China Series (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Google ScholarJean Oi , Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Google ScholarEdward S. Steinfeld , Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry, Cambridge Modern China Series (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Google ScholarOn Brazil, see Montero , Shifting States in Global Markets; Google ScholarTendler , Good Government in the Tropics. Google Scholar | Crossref |
| See the references in notes 6, 11, and 15. Google Scholar |
| The key works on Latin American federalism are Tulia Falleti , “A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 327-346; Google ScholarGuinazu , “The Subnational Politics of Structural Adjustment”; Google ScholarSteven Levitsky , Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Google ScholarAlfred P. Montero and David J. Samuels , Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004). Google ScholarFor Doner’s framework, see Doner et al. , “Systemic Vulnerability.” Google Scholar | Crossref |
| Excellent discussions of gatekeeper, glass ceiling, and asymmetric market power can be found in Henry Farrell and Jack Knight , “Trust, Institutions, and Institutional Change: Industrial Districts and the Social Capital Hypothesis,” Politics & Society 31, no. 4 (2003): 537-566; Google ScholarGary Gereffi , John Humphrey , and Timothy Sturgeon , “The Governance of Global Value Chains,” Review of International Political Economy 12 (2005): 78-104; Google ScholarJohn Humphrey and Hubert Schmitz , “Chain Governance and Upgrading: Taking Stock,” in Local Enterprises in the Global Economy, ed. H. Schmitz (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004), 349-381. Google ScholarOn the problems of coordination, especially in Latin America, see Ostrom , “Coping with Tragedies”; Google ScholarSchneider , Business Politics and the State. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals |